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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE THEORY OF DELIVERY IN GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS
The gift causa mortis in Anglo-American law is a subject which has caused
much perplexity and which has given rise to a great deal of legal controversy. It
is usually required by the American courts that the gift shall be made in contemplation of the donors impending death; that there be a clearly expressed intention to make a present gift; that the subject matter of the gift be delivered to
the donee; and that the donor die of the existing peril without revoking the
gift 1
The purpose of tls note is to examine the requirement of delivery as it is
applied to gifts causa mortis and to suggest a rule more in keeping with the true
nature of such transfers. Perhaps, this can best be accomplished by summarizing
the present positions of the courts on tlus problem, and by evaluating these
modern views against the historical rationalization of the gift causa mortis.
It is the general American view that the type of delivery required m gifts of this
nature is the same as that required to make a valid gift inter vivos.- As one court has
aptly expressed it, "It must be a delivery as a gift and such a delivery, as in case
of a gift inter vivos would invest the donee with the title to the subject of the
gift." Therefore, it becomes important to understand the doctrine of delivery as
it exists in gifts inter vivos.
The delivery required in gifts inter vivos is usually stated to be an actual,
constructive, or symbolical delivery according to the circumstances. It is commonly stated that the delivery must be as perfect as the nature of the property
and the circumstances and surroundings of the parties will reasonably permit.
The usual test applied to any inter vivos delivery is that it must be such a delivery as will most effectually divest the donor of dormmon and control over the
subject of the gift. In addition the delivery must be absolute and unqualified, and
it must vest the donee with, and divest the donor of, control and dominion over
the property."
From the foregoing it may be observed that delivery in gifts inter vivos is a
techical and sometimes ill-defined requirement, tested primarily by possession
and control. Generally, the courts purport to apply the inter vvos test to gifts
causa mortis so that, theoretically at least, the same rules and restrictions apply
to both situations. This would seem to imply that these courts regard delivery as
an essential element of a gift causa mortis.
A good example of this approach is found in the case of McDonough v.
Portland Savings Bank.' In this case the donor was very ill and upon being informed that she was to be taken to a hospital she called her mece to her bedside
and said, "If I am that sick, you had better take that bank book that is in the
trunk there and have your name put on it." The mece got the book and took it
to the aunt who then said, "Take thus and if anything happens to me divide that
between yourself and Helen.
" Later that day the mece took the book to the
bank and informed an official of what her aunt had said, whereupon she was
given an order to be signed by Miss McDonough as authority for transferring the
account. The following morning the donor signed this order wuch the niece reM

'O'Connell v. Bank for Savings, 108 Misc. 96, 170 N.Y.S. 566, 567 (1918).
88 C. I. S. 903, n. 92.
'Bynum v. Fidelity Bank, 219 N. C. 109, 12 S.E. 2d 898, 901 (1941),
448 C. J. S., p. 797.
'136 Me. 71. 1 A. 2d 768 (1938).
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turned to the bank immediately. A new account was opened and a new account
book was issued in the joint names of the aunt and the mece. After the aunt's
death the mece claimed the money m the account as a gift causa mortis. The
court refused to uphold the gift on the grounds that the delivery was insufficient.
In its decision the court stated, "
as in gifts inter vzvos, so in gifts causa mortis.
it must appear that the donor intends to and does in fact surrender absolutely all
present and future dominion and control over the property.
"' Since the donor
bad the right to draw on the account, the court concluded that she had not surrendered dommon and control and therefore the attempted gift was ineffective.
In this case the court clearly applied the test of the inter wvios delivery and by
strictly adhering to that test they found that the delivery was insufficient. This
approach might be termed the inter vwvos test for the causa mortis delivery.
In contrast with this strict and arbitrary view, at least one American court
has seen fit to relax the requirement of delivery in the causa mortis cases and to
allow less than a normal inter vivos delivery to suffiice. In the case of Begovwch v.
Kruljac9 the donor was about to undergo a serious operation. He delivered certain money to a third person with directions that the money should belong to the
donees in case he should die. It was not to be given to the donees until after
his death and was to be returned to him if he survived the operation. The
delivery was attacked as being insufficient since no actual delivery was made
to the donees until after the donors death. The court held the delivery to be
sufficient, and in the course of its opinion it used the following interesting language:
"It is frequently said that a gift causa mortis partakes of a
legacy in that it is not fully effective until after the death of the donor,
and that it partakes of a gift inter vtvos in that it must be delivered
during the lifetime of the decedent. The intention to give must be
clear in either case. In gifts inter vtvos the primary intent and purpose is to give immediate control of and dominion over the property
to the donee. The intent to give is not sufficient. It must be fully and
completely carried out.
No gift is made, unless it was perfected
by actual delivery, fully and completely giving dominion over, and
control of, the subject of the gift during the donors lifetime to the
donee.
In other words, delivery is just as much a constituent element of such gift as the intention to give.
A legacy, on the
other hand, passes into the enjoyment of the beneficiary of the gift
only upon the death of the giver.
Now, a gift causa mortis, too,
cannot come into the enjoyment of the donee till after the death of
the donor. It is in that respect exactly like a testamentary bequest.
The requirement as to delivery of the gift, accordingly, cannot be for
the purpose of transfermng possession and enjoyment, but in the
nature of things cannot be for any other purpose than is subserved
by the execution of a testament in the manner required by law;
namely, to prevent fraud and make the intentions and wishes of the
donor certain and definite. Hence while in gifts inter vinos delivery
is one of the constituent elements thereof, it subserves but the purpose
of evidence in gifts causa mortis.
In the former case it is one of
the ends in view; in the latter, it is but a means to an end."' (Italics
writer s).
0

Id. at -- I A. 2d at 770.
'38
Wyo. 365, 267 Pac. 426 (1928).
8
id. at 267 Pac. 429.
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The court in this case seemed to be moved primarily by the wish to give
effect to the donor s last wishes, and so relaxed the rule in order to do equity in
the case. This might be termed the evidentiary test for the requirement of delivery in gifts causa mortis.
In addition to these two clear-cut theones as to the nature of a causa mortis
delivery there is a third group of cases which fall somewhere in between these
two views. These courts usually pay lip-service to the rule that an inter vrvos delivery is required in the causa mortis situation, but in some of the more difficult cases they are wont to relax the inter ,ivos test and in effect apply the
evidentiary view. Several decisions from the Kentucky Court will serve to
illustrate this anomaly.
In the early case of Meriwether v. Mornson the Court used this language, "So
far as the act of delivery is necessary to complete the gift, the law is the same
as to gifts causa mortis and inter vrvos."' The latest expression of the test of delivery in gifts inter vivos is found in the case of Pikeville Nat'l Bank v. Shirley."
There the Court said:
to make them valid as gifts inter vtvos it was necessary that there should be a delivery whereby the donor gave up
domimon and control over the subject matter of the gifts and placed
same in the donee dunng their lives. To constitute such a gift the
property must be delivered absolutely and the gift go into immediate
unconditional effect. If future control over the property remain in the
donor until his death there was no valid gift inter vivos. It is absolutely essential to the validity of such gifts that there should be a
delivery to the donee whereby the thing given should imediately
pass and be irrevocable by the donor."' (Italics writers).
If the Court means what it says in these two cases the following conclusions
may be reached. In a gift causa mortis there must be a delivery whereby the
donor gives up all dominion over the subject of the gift and vest it in the donee.
He may not retain any power of future control over the property if the gift is to be
effective. This conclusion was not reached in a later Kentucky case. In Scherzmger v. Scherzinger' the donor was seriously ill with cancer. He knew that he
could not live long and desired that all his property should go to his wife after his
death. Accordingly, he called m an attorney and deeded all his real property to
his wife. In addition he had his wife s name added to his personal checking account at the bank, thus making it a joint account and payable at the order of
either. After the husband's death this transfer of the money contained in the
account was attacked as a gift causa mortis on the ground that the delivery was
not complete, since the donor retained the right to draw on the account. The
Court in upholding the gift stated:
"Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the proof
shows his intention to make such a gift. We think also that the circumstances heretofore reviewed show clearly that there was a delivery of the money in the two accounts in the bank from the deceased to his wife. These conditions and circumstances are ample,
in our opinion, to support the gift as a gift causa mortis, notwith078 Ky. 572, 576 (1880).
0281 Ky. 150, 185 S.W 2d

426 (1939).
Id. at 155, 135 S.W 2d at 430.
'280 Ky. 44, 132 S.W 2d 537 (1939).
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standing the appellants contention that the deceased had the right
to write checks on hIs bank account after the gift was made.""
(Italics writers).
Clearly in ths case there was not a complete surrender of donumon and
control. Notice the similarity of the fact situation m tlus case and in the
McDonough case. In both cases the donor at any time he wished had, not only
the power to deplete the account, but also the legal right to take such action. It
would appear that in this case the court ignored the test of an inter vivos delivery
as applied in the, McDonough case, and in effect adopted the evidentiary view.
A good many of the courts which allow a more liberal rule m the causa mortis
cases do so on the theory that the delivery must be as perfect as the nature of the
property and the surroundings and the circumstances of the parties will reasonably
permit. Ths might be termed the circumstances test of the causa mortis delivery.
The same test is often used and applied to sustain a constructive or symbolical delivery in the inter vtvos cases. When this approach is used in the causa mortis
situation the courts seemingly reconcile the statement that "the delivery in both
inter vivos and causa mortis gifts is the same." It should be noted, however, that
in application of the test to the causa mortis transfer some very loose deliveries
have been allowed. In the case of Pushcash v. Dry Dock Savings Institution the
circumstances test was employed to sustain a gift causa mortis although no delivery was made until after the donor s death. There the donor was near death
in a hospital and wished to make a gift of money in a savings account to hIs best
friend and only acquaintance. In the presence of the donee and the staff doctor,
the donor expressed his intention to make the gift and attempted to get out of bed
and give the bank book to the donee. The doctor informed him that the bank
book was locked in the office and could not be obtained until the following morning. He said, however, that if the donee would call for the bank book on the
following day he would see that it was delivered to hm. The donor made no
objection to ths arrangement and was apparently satisfied. That mght the donor
died. On the day following the bank book was delivered to the donee. The court
in upholding the gift pointed out that the donor had done all he could to perfect
it and stated, "The delivery was as perfect and complete as the circumstances
and surroundings of the parties to the gift reasonably permitted, and, this being
so, the gift was consummated."'
Perhaps, an even stronger case upholding a questionable delivery is that of
Mackenzie v. Steeves." In that case the court clearly recognized that under proper
circumstances the requirement of delivery could be entirely dispensed with. In
this case the donor on his death-bed said to his sweetheart, "I give you my automobile, May.
" After the donor s death the donee took possession of the automobile and treated it as her own. The court in finding that a valid gift causa
mortis had been made stated the following,
"
where the intent to bestow is obvious and clear, and
there is no evidence of fraud or undue influence, and the circumstances show that the donor has done all that in hIs opimon is neces-

Id. at 50,
"140 Misc.
Id. at -"98 Wash,

182 S.W 2d at 540.
579, 251 N. Y. S. 184 (1931).
251 N. Y. S. at 186.
17, 167 Pac. 50 (1917).
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sary to do to accomplish his purpose, the intent of the donor will
answer for the act of delivery.
"If the property is of such a character and the circumstances of the parties are such that there can be no delivery, manual
or symbolical, there may be a constructive delivery depending upon
the intent of the donor and the subsequent conduct of the
donee.

"f

(Italics writers)

Certainly, in these two cases it cannot be demed that the court employed a
much more liberal rule in regard to delivery than is used in the inter tnvos cases.
The causa mortis cases seldom refer to "domimon and control" wich are the backbone of the usual inter vivos test. It is submitted that while in theory these courts
may be requiring the same land of delivery in both types of cases, in reality, they
are applying two different tests which result in a less strict delivery in causa mortis
cases.
With the present position of the courts on this problem in mind, it might be
well to examine the historical background of the gift causa mortis in an effort to
determine its true function in the law. The concept had its origin in the Civil
law and was brought into the English cases after the Statute of Frauds made
the rurcupative wills unenforceable.' Its purpose was probably to give effect to
a death-bed gift which could not be sustained in any other fasion " In the Civil
law these donations were looked upon primarily as legacies, and indeed, were
declared to be upon the same footing as legacies by a formal constitution passed
for the avowed purpose of setting to rest certain doubts wich had arisen concernming their exact nature.? The gift causa mortis appeared in the English cases
early in the eighteenth century, but the concept was not fully considered until the
case of Ward v. Turner." In that landmark decision Lord Hardwicke, although
mistaken as to the true nature of the gift causa mortis in the Civil law,-- adopted
the concept as a part of the English common law and for the first time definitely
established that delivery was required. There is little doubt that the type of delivery adopted was the inter vivos method. This is borne out by the following two
facts: (1) this was the only type of chattel delivery with which the English
jurists of that day were familiar, and (2) the later English decisions on the point
proceeded on tis assumption. For example, in the case of Bunn v. Markham' the
court held that in order to constitute a good donatio mortis causa there must be
an absolute and unconditional delivery -of possession to the donee, or to a third
person in trust for him, which possession must continue uninterrupted, to the
time of the donors death. This case leaves little doubt that the inter vivos delivery was required, since delivery of possession was usually required to perfect an
inter vivos gift at the common law. Fundamentally, the rule in England is the
same today, but in at least one case the hard and fast rule of inter vtvos delivery
was relaxed.'
' Id. at --

167 Pac. at 52.

" Rundell, Gifts of Choses in Action, 27 YALE L. J. 642, 646 (1918).
"f Schouler, Oral Wills and Death-bed Gifts, 2 L. Q. REv. 444, 447 (1886).
' BRoWN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY sec. 51, n. 77
(1936).
'2 Ves. Sr. 431, 28 Eng. Rep. 275 (1752).
"Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. Jun. 111, 119, 30 Eng. Rep. 548, 552 (1793).
'7 Taunt. 224, 129 Eng. Rep. 90 (1816).
2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 180 (2d ed. 1911).
'8Umon of London-Smith s Bank v. Wasserberg, 1 Ch. 195, 112 L. T. Rep.
242, 244 1915).
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The English court from the very beginning seemed to regard the gift causa
mortis as more like a testamentary disposition than as a gift inter vivos. This is
indicated by the fact that in England and in a minority of American jurisdictions
the title to the gift is not complete until the donor s death.' Therefore, in England and in the American courts which follow the English view, the gift is spoken
of as being made on a condition precedent and title is not completely vested in
the donee until the donor s death. By the majority Amencan view the gift causa
mortis is regarded as a particular type of gift inter vivos. The gift is said to be
made on a condition subsequent and complete title must vest in the donee during
the lifetime of the donor or the gift is invalidY
This difference m approach serves to throw some light on the position of the
majority of American courts in demanding that the delivery in causa mortis gifts
be the same as in inter vtvos gifts. Since these courts think of the causa mortis gift
as being fundamentally a mere inter vivos gift made on a condition subsequent, it
is only natural, therefore, to expect these courts to require the inter vwvos delivery.
This reasomng supported by a long line of English and American decisions requiring an inter vivos delivery, give these courts ample authority for their position.
It is more difficult to justify the stand of the English courts in requiring the
inter vivos delivery. One would suppose that since they regard the title as mcomplete until the donors death that they would be more liberal in applying the rule
of a strict inter vivos delivery. It would seem that since delivery does not serve to
vest the complete title in England as it does in America, that the court should be
more lenient in the acts required to make a delivery. In practice, however, the
English courts require a more strict delivery than the American courts.' This is
probably true for at least two reasons: (1) a long line of English decisions requiring a strict inter vtvos delivery, coupled with a strong adherence to stare
deczss, and (2) a fear that a relaxation of the rule will result in fraudulent claims
to property after the principal witness to the transaction is dead.
From the foregoing discussion two things become apparent. (1) A gift causa
mortis is considered by the courts as something of a hybrid.' It is like a gift inter
vtvos on the one hand and like a testamentary disposition on the other. It partakes of the nature of both. (2) The courts are not in agreement as to how the
problem of delivery should be handled in this type of transfer. As we have seen
some of the courts use the strict inter vivos test, others use the more lement circumstances test, and at least one court has used the evzdentiary test. Which of
these tests best carries out the function of the gift causa mortis? It is the writer s
opinion that the ewidentiarj test is the most practical of the three. In support of
this proposition the following historical background and reasoning are set forth.
It cannot be doubted that these gifts are an exception to the Statute of
Vills. They allow the individual to dispose of his personal property by what is
in effect a testamentary disposition without the formalities and safeguards usually
-'Beaumont v. Ewbank, 1 Ch. 889, 86 L. T. Rep. 410 (1902); Hatcher v.
Buford, 60 Ark. 169, 29 S.W 641 (1895).
-" For a collection of cases see BRowN, op. cit. supra note 21, sec. 55, n. 89.
'A brief glance at the title Gifts in 25 ENG. & Ews. DIGEST will convince
anyone familiar with the subject that the American decisions are much more liberal
in both the inter rvos and causa mortis cases.
"'It
[gift causa mortis] is
of an amphibious nature-neither a complete
disposition inter vmvos nor a testamentary gift." Beaumont v. Ewbank, supra note
27, 86 L. T. Rep. at 411.
"Supra note 5 at -- 1 A. 2d at 769.
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reserved for such a transfer. By what reasoning then are they justified in the
law? One writer has expressed the answer in these words, "
under a legal
system recognizing the individualistic institution of private property and granting
to the owner the power to determine his successors in ownership, the general
philosophy of the courts should favor giving effect to an intentional exercise of
that power."'" This is precisely what the courts seem to be doing in sustaining
these gifts, and this attitude is probably the underlying reason why many courts
have seen fit to relax the requirement of delivery in the cause mortis cases. The
causa mortis gift was almost unheard of in English law until the Statute of
Frauds outlawed the nuncupative will.' Apparently as a result of this the courts
in certain cases began to allow this form of disposition, testamentary in nature, in
order to give effect to the wishes of a dying man. Unfortunately, this type of
death-bed transfer came to be abused. Many spurious and doubtful claims were
being made and the courts began to place certain restrictions upon it in order to
prevent fraud. This was probably the original purpose for requiring a delivery,
since delivery was not required at the Civil law to make such gifts effective.'
There is little, if any, indication that the requirement of delivery was meant to
take from the individual his right to dispose of his property as he desired. They
were obviously formulated only for the purpose of protecting that property from
unjust claims. Unfortunately, the courts in many cases seem to have lost sight of
these basic ideas and have defeated the attempted donation solely on the ground
that no technical inter vivos delivery occurred.
The true function of the gift causa mortis is to provide a method by which an
individual in peril of death may dispose of his property as he sees fit. It is an
emergency measure available to those tardy persons who have failed to make a
proper will, and to those who wish to revoke or alter a regretted bequest. Surely,
no man should be denied the right to dispose of his property as he chooses solely
because he has not made a will. This basic premise is supported by the fact that
gifts causa mortis are recognized in our law. Bv the same token no man should
be denied this right because he has failed to perform some technical requirement
of the law of which he was probably ignorant in the beginning. These gifts are
usually made without the advice of an attorney and a layman cannot be expected
to know the intricate, technical, requirements of the law, which puzzle even the
learned jurists.
If these assumptions are correct, it follows that the gift causa mortis is a
umque and peculiar method of transferring personal property reserved for one
particular ituation, i.e. in peril of death. It is of itself a separate and distinct
concept, and as such it should be accorded the rules appropriate to its function.
If the gift causa mortis is once regarded as a separate legal concept, it becomes
apparent that neither the rules of gifts nor of legacies are binding on such a transfer. True, it resembles both in some respects, but this does not prevent it from
having its own rules which will more faithfully execute its function.
For these reasons the writer has concluded that the emdentiary test of delivery is more in harmony with the real nature of the gift cause mortis than the
other tests which the courts apply. It recogmzes that the purpose of the gift is
Gulliver and Tilson, Classification of Gratutious Transfers, 51

YALE

L. J.

1, 2 (1941).
Supra note 20, at 447.
S
in View of Death, 1 AM. L. RE . 1, 7 (1852); Waugh v. Richardson,
107 W Va. 43, 147 S.E. 17, 20 (1929).
'Gifts
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to allow the donor to dispose of his property as he desres. In addition, it guards
against fraud by requiring that the donor s intention be shown with reasonable
certainty. It is honest and to the point, in that it does not deal in the confusing
inter rovos language so often employed by most courts. It provides the individual
with a relatively simple and safe method of making a death-bed donation, and
above all it allows him to die with a reasonable hope that his last wishes will be
respected.
JAMS V MARcUMd

DELEGATION OF POWER TO FIX PREVAILING WAGES
WITH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT AS
THE STANDARD
Fear that the economic power of the State as employer and contractor might
be utilized to undermine hard-fought-for wage scales has caused labor leaders to
press for legislation to prevent such a threat. In response to tins influence the
Kentucky legislature has enacted a statute which regulates the wages of workmen engaged in construction work of a public nature in Kentucky. This so-called
"prevailing wage" statute is as follows:
"Before advertising for bids or entering into any contract
for construction of public works, every public authority shall ascertain
the prevailing rates of wages of laborers, workmen, mechanics, helpers,
assistants and apprentices for the class of work called for in the construction of such public works in the locality where the work is to be
performed. This schedule of wages shall be attached to and made a
part of the specifications for the work and shall be printed on the
bidding blanks and made a part of every contract for the construction
of public works."'
"The wages paid for a legal day s work to laborers, workmen, mechanics, helpers, assistants and apprentices upon public works
shall not be less than the prevailing wages paid in the same trade or
occupation in the locality. The public authority shall establish prevailing wages at the same rate that prevails in the locality under collective agreements or understandings between bona fide orgamzations of labor and their employers at the date the contract for public
works is made if there are such agreements or understandings in the
locality applying to a sufficient number of employees to furnish a
reasonable basis for considering those rates to be the prevailing rates
-2
in the locality.
In the recent case of Baughn v. Gorrell & Riley these two sections of this act
were held constitutional by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the face of an attack that the act made an unlawful delegation of legislative power to a private
interest to regulate or fix wages.' This note will make an examnation of this decision and analogous cases in the light of a general consideration of the problem
of delegation of legislative power in an effort to determine the soundness of this
holding of the Kentucky Court.
'Ky.

RiEv. STAT. sec.

837.510 (1948).

Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 337.520 (1948).
Baughn v. Gorrell & Riley, 311 Ky. 537, 224 S.W 2d 436 (1949).
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